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Efficiency Unbound: Processual 
Deterrence for a New Legal Realism 
Riaz Tejani* 
Optimal deterrence theory seeks to promote resource maximization by 
identifying the most economically useful occasions and magnitudes for legal 
liability. But liability is only the final outcome of a burdensome process made 
more onerous for many today by widening inequalities in wealth and access 
to justice. Omission of this may reflect a preoccupation among tort theorists 
with large corporate actors and a drift further from the dilemmas of 
individual and social justice. Select lessons from American Legal Realism 
prompt us to go beyond liability to think about the deterrent function of legal 
process itself. These lessons challenge us to consider the interpretive dimension 
of human behavior in its response to not only norm enforcement but also 
threats thereof. Taking up that challenge, this Article suggests that 
considerations of optimal deterrence should account for the behavioral impact 
of what it terms the “specter of process,” in other words the fear of litigation 
itself, and that doing so requires a stronger bridge between economic and 
interpretive empirical studies of law. The revised theory may be said to 
include processual deterrence, the degree to which the behavior of legal subjects 
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INTRODUCTION 
Optimal deterrence theory, even under its own stated objectives, stands to 
benefit from embracing an interpretive, behaviorist approach inspired by the classic 
American Legal Realists. Until now, optimal deterrence, formed within a law and 
economics framework, has emphasized the deterrent impact of legal liability in 
shaping future behavior.1 Liability, meanwhile, has become just one of several 
sources of coercion supporting social control and inducing behavioral compliance.2 
Legal process, the formal steps by which parties seek out or evade liability, has itself 
become increasingly burdensome on individual and small corporate actors.3 This 
has become more apparent as problems in access to justice are increasingly 
identified across our legal system.4 Therefore, the specter of process, I suggest, may be 
just as important in achieving deterrent impacts as the heretofore dominant specter 
of liability. 
To study this, a revised behaviorist approach may be crucial. Whereas law and 
economics scholars have espoused a certain kind of behaviorism, theirs is by design 
a schematic one that presupposes rational minds operating in individual fashion 
throughout an atomized social environment.5 This use of behaviorism may have 
been partly inspired by the Realist writers of the early twentieth century, but a 
different version of behaviorism—an interpretive one further influenced by the 
cultural anthropology of the intervening years—is further necessary to assimilate 
the specter of process into a theory of optimal deterrence.6 Taking into account the 
contemporary specter of process, that revised theory may be said to include processual 
 
1. See Brittan J. Bush, The Overlooked Function of Punitive Damages, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 161,  
171–73 (2014). 
2. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legal Realism for Economists, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191,  
191–92 (2009). 
3. I distinguish between small and large corporate actors insofar as the burdens of litigation—
already distributed unevenly through adhesion contracts in some cases—impact individuals and small 
businesses differently than they do large, multinational corporations. 
4. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). 
5. See Stephen R. Galoob & Adam Hill, Norms, Attitudes, and Compliance, 50 TULSA L. REV. 613, 
622–23 (2015). 
6. See Stephenson, supra note 2, at 196 n.4. But see BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING 
JURISPRUDENCE 54 (2007) (quoting Richard Posner on the incommensurability of Realism and his 
economic theory of justice). 
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deterrence, the degree to which the behavior of legal subjects may be shaped ex ante 
by the fear of simply being implicated in the burdensome process of litigation.7 
Grasping processual deterrence demands understanding what legal decisions 
and rules mean to the people they influence. The social scientific approach most 
associated with meaning has been called “interpretivism.” Interpretivism is a subset 
of behaviorism borrowed from cultural anthropology.8 To its critics, it is simply the 
“reading” of social symbols and cues from afar.9 But to its adherents this is a 
caricature; for them an interpretive approach is the only way to access knowledge 
of how the world, legal or otherwise, appears “Real” to its inhabitants. 
For the Realists, the value of interpretation was becoming apparent in the 
interwar period.10 Llewellyn, for example, acknowledged the notion that “facts” 
about law and legal systems required proper framing by legal academics who could 
improve their accuracy through fieldwork.11 
Arguing for the embrace of this intellectual lineage, Part I of this Article 
examines the thinking behind optimal deterrence, including the larger law and 
economics preoccupation with defining social utility as “wealth maximization.” Part 
II then questions the primacy of liability as the inaugural moment in the behavioral 
influence of tort litigation. In Part III, the discussion turns to legal process as 
another possible symbolic fixture in the minds of impacted legal subjects. Part IV 
then explores the study of this fixture by first examining the behavioral assumptions 
underlying current optimal deterrence theory, then looking to the precedent 
behaviorism of the classic Legal Realists, and finally illustrating the ways in which 
certain extralegal disciplines have conceived of behavioral studies. Part V then offers 
a roundup of key implications from considering processual deterrence, and Part VI 
attempts to draw these sections into a coherent closure. 
I. OPTIMAL DETERRENCE? 
Optimal deterrence is one of several competing policy “functions” of 
American tort law.12 Scholars disagree about the number, validity, and relationship 
among these various functions, and the precise meaning of “function” itself is open 
to substantial disagreement.13 For instance, does any given policy function explain 
the way judicial decisions are actually reached, or does it explain the governing logic 
by which such decision should be reached? Some would describe this opposition as 
 
7. See infra Part II. 
8. See id. at 16–17, 20; see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory 
of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS BY CLIFFORD GEERTZ 16–17, 
20 (1973). 
9. See id. at 16–17. 
10. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930), 
reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 53, 55–56 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). 
11. See id. at 57–58. 
12. KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 16–23 (4th ed. 2012). 
13. Id. 
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one between tort policy’s positive and normative modalities.14 Further, as Kenneth 
Abraham has said, 
Although much of modern tort law scholarship has been concerned with 
analysis of and debate about the nature and proper functions of tort law, 
they remain contested. Some scholars argue that tort law is, and should be, 
rights-based . . . . Others see tort law’s function as more instrumental . . . . 
And still others see tort law as a mixed system that performs a combination 
of these and other functions.15 
Among the rights-based approaches Abraham identifies are corrective justice and civil 
recourse.16 Corrective justice theory says that tort disputes should be resolved with an 
eye for correcting the moral imbalance resulting from nonreciprocal harm 
creation—as in the case of a car accident caused by the fault of one driver alone.17 
Civil recourse theory says that tort law should be primarily concerned not with 
righting social wrongs but rather with securing the right of all individuals equally to 
pursue a civil claim in the appropriate forum should they determine this to be 
necessary given the harm they have suffered.18 In these two conceptions, tort law 
protects a right, whether it is to correction itself, or to the pursuit of correction. 
In addition to rights-based approaches, scholars have identified 
instrumentalist functions of tort law that, loosely speaking, pursue broader social 
goals such as distributional equality or social control.19 In the former category are 
the policy functions of loss distribution, compensation, and social justice.20 Loss 
distribution, supported by key jurists like William Traynor of the Supreme Court of 
California during the advent of strict products liability, holds that tort disputes 
should be resolved in a way to spread the costs of harm generated across the 
“cheapest cost avoider”—the institutional or social entity that can most easily 
absorb its burdens.21 The compensation and social justice functions, meanwhile, 
tend to be downplayed.22 Although their principles appeal most to the lay public 
and left social activists in their apparent rectification of injury and historical or 
structural inequalities, tort scholars have frequently emphasized that the “system” 
is not designed to remedy such problems.23 Moreover, these scholars say that doing 
so would be simply “inefficient.”24 
Optimal deterrence, meanwhile, is the policy function of torts perhaps most 
preoccupied with social control. Its goal is to steer individual behavior towards what 
 
14. See id. at 16–17. 
15. Id. at 17. 
16. Id. at 17–18. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 18. 
19. Id. at 18–23. 
20. Id. 
21. See id. at 19–20; see also Donald G. Gifford, Death of Causation: Mass Products Torts’ Incomplete 
Incorporation of Social Welfare Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 975 (2006). 
22. See id. at 21–22. 
23. Id. at 22–23. 
24. Id. at 22. 
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its proponents consider the most efficient use of social resources.25 It is, in other 
words, social control for wealth maximization. 
A. Deterrence 
Deterrence is a supremely powerful idea.26 It allows law to move between the 
normative registers of ought and is, registers Karl Llewellyn called for the separation 
of in his vision of a realistic jurisprudence.27 When we identify or create a rule to 
govern behavior, we say that this is how one “ought to” or “should” behave. 
Persons under the common law of torts, for instance, should act in ways that 
minimize harm to themselves even after being injured by another person.28 But 
when we want to assess whether this rule is effective, whether it influences behavior, 
we must move into the descriptive realm of “is.” We say, for example, that people 
have been mitigating their losses ever since the above rule took effect. If this 
statement is true, then the rule above has had an observable deterrent effect. Justice 
Holmes emphasized this distinction early in his “bad man” theory of law articulated 
first in 1897.29 “[I]f we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that 
he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to 
know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much 
of his mind.”30 Under the “bad man” theory, deterrence is only a result of effectively 
applied or enforced law.31 
Since Holmes’ day, globalization has undoubtedly stretched the enforceability 
of legal norms. In global legal “communities” whose populations may now range 
beyond one billion people, law has the onerous task of controlling behavior and 
ordering populations without generally setting foot on real property, or laying a 
hand on real persons. Without this capacity of distanced ordering, law in these 
systems would be overburdened, ineffectual, and perhaps above all negligible. Or, 
as Llewellyn once wrote, “‘Law’ without effect approaches zero in its meaning.”32 
The deterrence function, therefore, appears to grow in importance with 
modernization. Increasingly, it gives law the efficiency to discipline growing and 
complexifying populations without practical administration of expensive 
punishment or liability. 
 
25. Id. at 18–19. 
26. See Roscoe Pound, What is Law?, in SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 35, 52 (2d ed. 1997) 
(“Austin and Maine taught that it is a habit of obedience on the part of people generally, a phase, 
perhaps, of that control over internal nature which is half of civilization, making it unnecessary to apply 
force except in a relatively small number of the controversies which arise in daily life and to the conduct 
of a relatively small proportion of the population.”). 
27. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1235–37 (1931). 
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
29. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, J. of the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of the Law, 
Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law ( January 8, 1897), 
in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–61 (1897). 
30. Id. at 460–61. 
31. See id. at 460. 
32. Llewellyn, supra note 27, at 1249. 
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B. Optimal I: Levels of Control 
But the question will always be precisely how much deterrence is appropriate. 
Attempting to answer this question, law and economics scholars have long spoken 
of optimal deterrence, the concept under which law’s discouragement of harmful or 
risky behavior should always maximize “social utility.”33 Here, there is a major 
difference between utility construed as happiness and utility construed as wealth 
maximization. The former, inherited from Jeremy Bentham, emphasizes aggregate 
pleasure while the latter emphasizes aggregate material resources.34 According to 
Richard Posner, law and economics critics have too often confused social utility 
with wealth maximization.35 
In order to maximize wealth, deterrent norms—norms that discourage risk 
and encourage precautions—must be balanced with wealth creation.36 The limit on 
deterrence, theorists suggest, should be placed at precisely the point at which social 
benefits from engaging in the activity can still outweigh social costs incurred from 
all its harms.37 Put otherwise, the aggregate costs of behavioral precaution or 
avoidance should not outweigh the aggregate benefit derived from the reduction in 
harms. In one illustration of this, automobile driving is considered a highly risky 
activity—one that brings a chance of death of one in eighty-four over the average 
lifetime of a human.38 And yet, despite this high risk, one that exceeds that of 
suicide,39 drowning,40 and shark attacks,41 we do not entirely ban the activity, or 
introduce safety measures that would make car ownership expenses prohibitive. 
Such measures would obliterate wealth-generating uses of driving that include 
everything from interstate commerce to workplace commuting to tourism. For law 
and economics thinkers, the current net benefits of driving are positive, and such 
cost prohibitive measures would be considered “overdeterrence.”42 Instead, we 
impose on automobile manufacturing, licensing, and driving a number of 
 
33. Benjamin Shmueli, Legal Pluralism in Tort Law Theory: Balancing Instrumental Theories and 
Corrective Justice, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 745, 754 (2015). 
34. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48–49 (1981). 
35. Id. at 49. 
36. Shmueli, supra note 33, at 756. 
37. Id. 
38. See WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS xlv (2d ed. 
2009) (“The goal of the legal system, on this view, should be to keep to a minimum the combined costs 
of precautions, accidents, and litigation. Sometimes this will mean that the law should try to induce 
people to take more precautions than they do; sometimes it will mean that people take too many 
precautions already, or that it is too costly to use the legal system to try to change their behavior. The 
rules of tort law thus should give people incentives to take precautions that are efficient—i.e., cost-
justified: precautions that prevent injuries more costly than the precautions but that allow injuries to 
occur if they are less costly than the precautions.”) (emphasis in original); see also Tara  
Parker-Pope, How Scared Should We Be?, N.Y. TIMES: WELL BLOG (Oct. 31, 2007, 3:19 PM),  
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/how-scared-should-we-be/ [https://perma.cc/XUB6-
AENU]. 
39. See Parker-Pope, supra note 38. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 70. 
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restrictions intended not to eliminate it but to make it marginally safer. With these 
additional burdens—for example, the seat belts introduced in the 1960s after 
vigorous advocacy by activists like Ralph Nader43—driving becomes more 
expensive, but not so much so that its wider benefits are outweighed. 
While the seat belt laws that emerged in that era were federal and regulatory 
in nature, other auto industry safety measures have been shaped by common law 
litigation.44 There, individual cases that have emerged by the thousands have literally 
chipped away at the once under-regulated activities of car manufacturing and 
driving to shape industry and individual behaviors through both the imposition of 
liability and the real, imminent threat thereof.45 In the case of the individual 
automaker or individual driver found culpable for causing a plaintiff’s harm, the 
imposition of liability has an immediate effect that many in criminal law would call 
“specific deterrence.”46 But in the case of the many more actors not immediately 
held liable, a single outcome can cause a change of behavior through what is often 
called “general deterrence.”47 
When law and economics scholars of tort law speak about optimal deterrence, 
they are typically referring to its capacity for general deterrence.48 How, they ask, 
will liability in this particular case—assuming this plaintiff receives the kind of 
remedy he or she is claiming—impact not just this defendant, but his or her entire 
community or industry?49 In first-year courses, law professors often point to the 
seminal 1932 Second Circuit case T.J. Hooper, in which a group of tugboats and their 
barges were lost at sea off of the New Jersey coast in part because their owner had 
not equipped them with weather radios.50 In an opinion fifteen years prior to the 
famous Caroll Towing case, Judge Learned Hand wrote that the absence of weather 
radios from most tugs within the local industry—evidence of industry custom—did 
not prove the reasonableness of such an omission.51 In short, T.J. Hooper established 
that in some cases, a jury may find that an entire industry is unreasonable in its 
conduct and thereby impose the widespread expense of technological upgrades 
 
43. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 124–
131, 206–210 (1990), for a discussion of Ralph Nader’s role in the development of seat belt 
requirements. 
44. See AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION SPURRED  
AUTO SAFETY INNOVATIONS (2010), https://www.justice.org/sites/default/files/file-uploads/ 
Driven_to_Safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JY5-PWXN]. 
45. Id. 
46. See, e.g., Dustyn Coontz, Beyond First Blush: The Utility of Shame as a Master Emotion in Criminal 
Sentencing, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 415, 436 (2015). 
47. Id. at 437. 
48. See Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 657–58 (1974–75); 
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 870, 
877 (1998). 
49. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 48, at 877 (“By deterrence, we mean what is often 
called general deterrence, namely, the effect that the prospect of having to pay damages will have on the 
behavior of similarly situated parties in the future (not just the behavior of the defendant at hand”). 
50. T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
51. Id. at 740. 
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across the board.52 In the average case, however, a finding of liability may have 
nothing to do with industry custom and may rather pertain only to individual acts of 
questionable reason. In such cases, findings for the plaintiff may not automatically 
alter community behavior, but they do impose the specter of liability in future 
similar cases. 
And yet, the specter of liability is only one possible influence on prospective 
defendant behavior. A second is one this Article calls the specter of process. Under the 
specter of process, prospective defendants, or risk-generating actors, may make 
decisions not only with the threat of liability factored into judgments about action, 
but also with the threat of litigation itself in mind. The difference between these 
two variables, although apparently slight from a distance, may be significant “up 
close.” The specter of liability—the threat of being held liable for damages in a tort 
case—is quite narrow in most cases.53 It indicates to a prospective defendant that, 
given a measure of risk-generating activity of uncertain reasonableness, he or she 
might be forced to compensate any injured party.54 Such prospective compensation 
may be small in comparison to the economic value of the activity engaged in, or it 
may be already “internalized”—prospectively factored into operating budgets—by 
the individual or enterprise engaging in the conduct.55 In either case, the specter of 
liability is simply the fear of legal liability, taking into account the likelihood of a 
failed legal defense. 
The specter of process is a much wider field of possibility. There, actors carry 
out conduct thinking not of potential ultimate liability, but the burdens and 
likelihood of litigation in and of itself. They effectively ask themselves, “Even if I 
am certainly not blameworthy for any harm this creates, how likely is it that I will 
be required and able to show this to a judge or jury?” Consideration of this variable 
in judgments about socioeconomic activity also takes into account possibilities for 
successful defense at any number of procedural levels within the civil process.56 The 
actor may or may not have confidence in victory at the demurrer stage, at the 
summary judgment stage, on directed verdict, and so on. Regardless of these 
intermediary options for victory, the overarching question is simply how much a 
 
52. The difference between a “jury may find” and a “jury must find” is very significant and 
indicates that even findings that may raise the specter of liability are no guarantee that they will 
consistently make good on this. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 38, at xliv–xlv. 
53. See John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law,  
85 MICH. L. REV. 1820, 1834 (1986–87) (“Specifically, while the efficacy of tort law depends on the 
imposition of full liability on all actors for their torts, the keystone of both corporate and bankruptcy 
law is the ability of firms, under some circumstances, to avoid paying all or part of their liabilities.”). 
54. See id. at 1826 (“Similarly, if a manufacturer simply cannot predict with any degree of 
certainty what its liability costs will be, it may forego safety-related expenditures that by hindsight would 
have been unquestionably rational.”). 
55. See id. at 1825 (discussing the internalization of liability cost into a business’s  
operating budget). 
56. See Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and Summary 
Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 48 (2008) (explaining that various motions can end a 
case at different stages in the litigation). 
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legal defense of an actor’s conduct will cost given both the likelihood of harm that 
it may create, and the legal response by prospective plaintiffs.57 To the extent that 
either the specter of liability or the specter of process has a normative influence on 
risk-generating actors, both play a significant role in tort law’s deterrence function.58 
But, with legal academic focus upon case law and damages, the extant scholarship 
has focused more on liability than process.59 
C. Optimal II: Law and Economics 
Law and economics scholars believe that legal dispute resolutions should 
generally serve the purpose of wealth maximization.60 To the extent economic 
theories of justice in tort law are concerned with social interests broader than 
individual litigant outcomes, they have been described as embracing a “public law” 
or “regulatory” approach to the civil justice system.61 This approach, at least within 
some academic circles, has nearly supplanted a once-accepted “private law” 
approach that saw torts as serving primarily the needs of individual claimants in 
singular disputes.62 The public law functions of tort law push stare decisis—the 
common law concept of “precedent” observed in British and American systems—
to a communal level by emphasizing the normative impact, not only upon similarly 
situated litigants in future cases, but also upon similarly situated actors in social and 
industrial life.63 
Two main proponents of this approach, Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, 
were both prominent legal scholars who went on to become revered federal 
appellate judges. These jurists introduced the theoretical propositions on which law 
and economics approaches to tort law would be based. They were followed by 
empirical scholars, primarily economists, who sought to test and support the notion 
that civil liability was best assessed in terms of social utility.64 
 
57. See Siliciano, supra note 53, at 1825 (explaining that the cost of litigation is tied to the inherent 
riskiness of behavior). 
58. Shmueli, supra note 33, at 754–55 (stating that the threat of litigation and liability perform a 
deterrence function in the context of tort law). 
59. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class 
Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002) (discussing the economics behind deterrence and 
liability for mass torts); Shmueli, supra note 33, at 754–55 (explaining that defendants shift behavior 
based on their predictions of liability); Siliciano, supra note 53, at 1825 (focusing on the deterrent effects 
of tort liability on corporate behavior). 
60. POSNER, supra note 34, at 48. 
61. Riaz Tejani, National Geographics: Toward a “Federalism Function” of American Tort Law,  
51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 81, 84 (2014). 
62. Id. at 87–88. 
63. FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 38, at xlvi–xlvii (“In the view of the first camp of 
scholars [optimal deterrence], the most important aspect of a court’s decision in a tort case is the impact 
it will have on the behavior of others in the future. The most prominent advocates of this view are 
economists who believe that the purpose of tort law should be to minimize the costs of accidents. Every 
accident or other tort creates costs for its victims; but precautions against accidents are expensive,  
too—as are lawsuits afterwards.”). 
64. Id. 
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It is important to reiterate that the social utility approach is not itself 
antithetical, and may instead be derivative of classic Legal Realist thought.65 On one 
level, Realism, as envisioned by Llewellyn and others, is a “consequentialist” 
approach to jurisprudence.66 It asks, as in Holmes’s “bad man” theory above, not 
simply what the formal doctrine says, but how it is used in practical ways to promote 
one or another idea of a just society.67 Law and economics, meanwhile, fills in the 
criteria for assessing justice with a simple economic question: How can law 
maximize social resources?68 
Importantly, though, this formulation of “social” is not the same as “public.” 
Although it constitutes a largely “public law” approach to tort outcomes, law and 
economics is concerned with wider social conduct and not strictly public resource 
maximization.69 Indeed, under its dominant conception, private wealth 
maximization is just as important as the commons, and it therefore can be equally 
well served by decisions that favor an elite so long as doing so contributes to an 
aggregate conception of what social resources are.70 In other words, distributional 
inequality remains acceptable until it interferes, for instance by resulting in higher 
crime, with the wealth maximization goal.71 The ultimate irony of this approach, 
then, is that it can publicize private resources while effectively privatizing public ones.72 
But, for quite a few scholars, the law of torts is (still) a moral enterprise 
requiring something more than economic consequentialism. Ward Farnsworth and 
Mark Grady capture well the dichotomy between economistic and moralistic 
approaches to tort doctrine: 
Economists often regard theories of corrective justice as mush . . . . Moral 
theorists are known to dismiss the economic approach on grounds of their 
own: skepticism about whether people have the knowledge and rationality 
to be deterred by tort law in the way that economists suggest, and rejection 
of efficiency as a morally appealing goal for the legal system.73 
Moralist scholars may be further divided into two groups: those who would 
advocate the deontological, moral implications of torts adjudication, and those who 
 
65. Stephenson, supra note 2 at 200–01. 
66. See id. at 201 (Llewelyn’s discussion of consequentialist jurisprudence). 
67. Holmes, supra note 29, at 459; see also Stephenson, supra note 2, at 201. 
68. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,  
995 (2001). 
69. Id. at 1050. 
70. See e.g. Tseming Yang, Balancing Interests and Maximizing Rights in Environmental Justice, 
23 VT. L. REV. 529, 529–30 (1999) (discussing the disparate impact of utilitarian principles on 
environmental justice for minority groups). 
71. RAYMOND A. BELLIOTTI, JUSTIFYING LAW: THE DEBATE OVER FOUNDATIONS, GOALS, 
AND METHODS 120–21 (1992) (explaining Posner’s argument that wealth inequality is acceptable unless 
it interferes with the larger wealth maximization goal). 
72. Although some, including certain Realists, were against public/private distinctions, the 
blurring of these boundaries is illusory and may be part of the larger discourse of neoliberalism. David 
Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,  
2014, at 16. 
73. FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 38, at xlvii. 
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would argue that the moral framework torts help to construct is itself an important 
consequentialist goal.74 
A major question that emerges in this debate is whether or not economic 
determinism can itself be considered a moral theory.75 Already in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, debates over utilitarianism dramatized this very question. 
Writing in his 1789 Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy 
Bentham argued that utilitarianism, the promotion of pleasure over pain, was a moral 
philosophy.76 In his 1863 response to critics of Bentham, John Stuart Mill 
elaborated that considerations in defining “pleasure” and “pain” are precisely what 
give utilitarianism its moral dimension.77 It becomes clear from this line of texts that 
the moral dimension of the utility principle is not in fact internal to the calculus 
about happiness itself, but rather located in the separate enterprise of valuation and 
value exchanges that ultimately get plugged into the cost-benefit analysis espoused 
by some.78 
But focus upon the separation of economy and morality has forestalled a 
rigorous conversation between partisans of social primacy and partisans of 
economic primacy. What is needed is a social approach that provisionally embraces 
economism and looks for ways its valuations might gain more nuance through social 
theory. As suggested below, an embrace of the behavioral sciences, as advocated by 
certain Legal Realists but updated to account for interpretivism, may be such an 
approach. 
II. THE SPECTER OF LIABILITY 
Optimal deterrence theorists have focused primarily upon the deterrent 
function of civil liability.79 By this, I mean simply the determination at any given 
stage of the legal process that the defendant shall be made to pay for the victim’s 
injury. While in cases of negligence this succeeds a determination of 
blameworthiness, in cases of strict liability it does not. As Posner has famously said, 
the aptitude of optimal deterrence theory is confirmed by the observation that 
findings of “fault” graph neatly onto societal attitudes about resource 
wastefulness.80 In other words, the person who crashes a car after turning ninety 
 
74. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Economics, the Moral Limits of the Market, and Threshold 
Deontology, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 214 
(Aristides N. Hatzis & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2015) (explaining the different perspectives of 
deontologists and consequentialists in tort theory). 
75. See e.g. Richard Posner, supra note 34, at 65–67. 
76. Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, in JUSTICE: A READER 9, 10 (Michael  
J. Sandel ed., 2007). 
77. See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in JUSTICE: A READER 14, 20–23 (Michael J. Sandel  
ed., 2007). 
78. It is interesting to consider that this may result, in part, from the same ambiguity of 
utilitarianism as fundamentally about happiness on one hand or wealth on the other. 
79. See Calabresi, supra note 48, passim; Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 passim (2000). 
80. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–34 (1972). 
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degrees to look at a momentary sunset should be liable because no amount of 
pleasure gained from the sunset is greater than the cost of injury and repair to 
himself or another driver. More importantly, society supposedly intuits this.81 
Different from fault liability, meanwhile, strict liability is a doctrine permitting 
liability for certain activities irrespective of the levels of care applied in their 
execution. Findings of strict liability are justifiable when the cost of harms inflicted 
under the greatest exercise of care can be more efficiently shouldered by the 
enterprises engaged in risky activity, such as product manufacturing and 
distribution, in some cases, or high-risk explosive demolition in others.82 
The emphasis on liability might be explained in two opposing ways. In the 
first, we might consider optimal deterrence a response to prior iterations of 
American tort theory. As John Goldberg reminds us, torts were initially a matter of 
clear private law whose purpose was to settle disputes between individual parties 
and repair some form of moral imbalance between them.83 For this purpose, what 
mattered most were dispute outcomes: not dispute processing. Although, 
conceivably, plaintiffs may have felt some sense of restorative justice simply from 
seeing their injurer tied up in legal proceedings, the costs of litigation could be 
burdensome on both parties, and therefore reciprocal in their informal punitive 
effects.84 To be sure, equitable remedies such as a public apology have long been 
available, but to be legally enforceable even these require final determination of 
something like liability.85 And so, a finding of liability was traditionally the “end 
game” of tort law in its customary, private law modality. The later emergence of 
public law tort theories reinforced this focal point.86 In one respect, the discourse 
of modern tort law had already been established by the mid-twentieth century when 
key scholars like Coase, Calabresi, Traynor, Prosser, and others began having 
greatest impact.87 
But, under a second possible explanation, optimal deterrence as a dominant 
public law theory has itself been immanently forward looking in its approach. 
Posner, offering in 1972 his widely cited interpretation of Judge Learned Hand’s 
approach to the negligence standard, styled the approach as one seeking out the 
most efficient balance between tolerating risky conduct and mandating untaken 
safety precautions.88 Negligence, Hand himself said, according to Posner, was only 
present when the tortfeasor had eschewed a precaution whose cost was less than 
 
81. Id. 
82. See, e.g., Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994);  
Sullivan v. Dunham, 55 N.E. 923, 924 (N.Y. 1900). 
83. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 522–523 (2003). 
84. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI  
L. REV. 111, 134 (1991–92). 
85. See Robyn Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 317, 318 (2013). 
86. See Goldberg, supra note 83, at 524. 
87. See, e.g., Robert G. Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development On Insurance: The 
Availability/Affordability Crisis And Its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 285, 287, 291 (1987–88). 
88. See Posner, supra note 80, at 32–33. 
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the aggregate (likelihood and size) of the cost of harms it was meant to avoid.89 The 
idea behind this interpretation of negligence, we were further told, was to maximize 
social efficiency, understood as wealth, moving forward.90 Liability, for this reason, 
remained the focus because it was the definitive pronouncement that would finalize 
a solution to each applied version of the Hand calculus.91 It was, in short, one 
necessary predicate to the conclusion that marginal risks would be efficiently 
deterred moving forward.92 Liability, then, was the key feature of the predictive 
power of the torts-as-public-law approach. 
III. PROCESS 
Today, two developments make the ongoing focus on liability increasingly 
unwise. The first is a growing gap in access to justice, making legal representation, 
particularly in low-value plaintiff actions and many defense cases, unaffordable and 
thus impossible.93 That social behavior among segments of the society influenced 
by these developments would not be adjusted to account for these facts seems 
implausible.94 Second, there may be increased (if distorted) public awareness about 
the process of litigation.95 As evident in more frequent public culture portrayals of 
lawyers, judges, courtroom, and litigants, average nonlawyers are increasingly 
exposed to certain aspects of legal process.96 While the accuracy of these portrayals 
is worth questioning, the fact of their increased circulation is sufficient reason to 
suspect that people may be more likely to act with them in mind.97 To access them, 
all that is required is a television, computer, or web-enabled smartphone. 
A. The Burdens of Process: Access to Justice and Public Culture 
The significance of process is heavily colored by problems of extreme 
economic inequality in the United States today. By recent reports, 20 percent of all 
wealth in the United States is now concentrated in the hands of “top” 0.1 percent 
of the population.98 Meanwhile, the “bottom” 50 percent of American households 
 
89. Id. 
90. See id. at 33–34. 
91. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
92. Id. 
93. See Robert R. Kuehn, Undermining Justice: The Legal Profession’s Role in Restricting Access to Legal 
Representation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1040–41 (2006). 
94. See CIV. LEGAL JUST. COALITION, TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: REPORT OF THE 
CIVIL LEGAL JUSTICE COALITION TO THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
36–37 (2014) (finding a significant connection between funding civil legal aid and increased social and 
economic benefits in Pennsylvania). 
95. See Kimberlianne Podlas, Impact of Television on Cross-Examination and Juror “Truth,” 14 
WIDENER L. REV. 483, 494 (2009). 
96. See id. 
97. See id. at 493 (noting that “[n]inety-eight percent (98%) of U.S. households own a television, 
making it our most pervasive medium.”). 
98. Jordan Weissmann, The Shocking Rise of Wealth Inequality: Is it Worse Than We Thought?, 
SLATE: MONEYBOX BLOG (Apr. 2, 2014, 4:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/
04/02/wealth_inequality_is_it_worse_than_we_thought.html [https://perma.cc/U6A9-HM74]. 
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possesses only 2.5 percent of all available wealth.99 The ability to absorb the costs 
of legal action, therefore, has changed, but this change is itself differential. The 
“marginal” value of money has decreased for the wealthiest among us, and increased 
for the poorest.100 Further still, that wealth disparity accompanies a documented 
inequality in “access to justice.”101 As several writers have already noted, while 
popular narratives decry the overabundance of attorneys nationwide, some 80% of 
poor Americans cannot access an attorney for basic needs.102 What all this means, 
in short, is that obtaining representation for oneself in court—long before any 
finding of liability—is increasingly troubling for many among us.103 For that group, 
simply being named in a lawsuit may signify approximately the same thing as being 
ultimately held liable.104 
For a neighboring segment of the population, middle-class individuals for 
instance, legal defense on the merits may be possible but still burdensome thanks 
to several aspects of the litigation process in the current historical moment.105 This 
moment, which some have referred to as “late” modernity, is characterized by a few 
key features worth noting.106 First, thanks to mass migration, particularly from 
countries of the Global South, “community” life in the metropolitan common-law 
countries is now highly cosmopolitan and may include social norms and notions of 
justice from all over the world.107 Second, harms generated by both industrial and 
individual risk-taking are now, with the help of faster travel and communications, 
capable of more rapid and widespread impacts.108 A privacy breach of the billing 
system at one retail chain store, we have recently seen, can lead to injury and claims 
among millions of people across a continent.109 And finally, with the presence of 
information technology, parties can be quickly made aware of information that is 
 
99. Larry Schwartz, 35 Soul-Crushing Facts About American Income Inequality, SALON, ( Jul. 15, 2015, 
10:15 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/07/15/35_soul_crushing_facts_about_american_income_ 
inequality_partner/ [https://perma.cc/E9GQ-N6DU]. 
100. See Drew Desilver, 5 Facts About the Minimum Wage, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
( Jul. 23, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/23/5-facts-about-the-minimum-
wage/ [https://perma.cc/9R3A-VJSR] (noting that since the federal minimum wage was last  
raised in 2009, “the federal minimum has lost about 8.1% of its purchasing power to inflation.”). 
101. RHODE, supra note 4, at 32–34. 
102. See id. at 3, 5. 
103. See id. at 13. 
104. In such instances, there is good reason to think lay individuals may overestimate costs. See 
id. at 32 (noting that “[o]ver four-fifths of surveyed Americans believe that litigation is too slow and 
too costly.”). 
105. See id. at 3 (indicating legal representation is out of reach to 40 to 60% of middle 
class Americans). 
106. See Katherine Beckett, Crime and Control in the Culture of Late Modernity, 35 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 899, 900–901 (2001) (discussing the study of crime and control as subjects “central to the social 
life of ‘late modern’ societies.”). 
107. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,  
448–49 (2002). 
108. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 4 (2007). 
109. Charles Riley & Jose Pagliery, Target Will Pay Hack Victims $10 Million, CNNMoney, 
(Mar. 19, 2015, 3:05 PM) http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/19/technology/security/target-data-
hack-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/7R3J-6WQ2]. 
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both accurate and inaccurate regarding risk, injuries, and their own legal rights and 
liabilities.110 
These features distinguish the current era from an earlier age—the one in 
which economic approaches to deterrence were first theorized by writers like Coase 
and Calabresi.111 In the 1960s and 1970s when these scholars were writing, Western 
industrialized nations were indeed witness to complex, mass risk-taking, but the 
wider cultural (and thus normative) context in which this took place was not yet 
“globalized.”112 Information about liability, meanwhile, was also more concentrated 
in the hands of experts.113 
B. The Specter of Process 
With the advent of recent social and technological developments, the meaning 
of legal process may have grown more severe as indicated by several observations 
about legal culture. First, we have witnessed the birth and widespread reproduction 
of the phrase “lawyer up.” Lawyering up, most will recognize, is a popular culture 
term for retaining an attorney as the result of a particular dispute.114 But its 
significance goes beyond this. The phrase is used both defensively (as in “I’m going 
to lawyer up”), and offensively (as in “you better lawyer up”).115 Using a basic 
Internet search engine (Google) n-gram to chart occurrences of “lawyering up” in 
English language texts over the past few decades, one finds that the phrase begins 
making an appearance in 1995 and then increases in frequency by roughly 9000% 




110. In England, this has been called “compensation culture,” although some argue rising 
awareness has not truly resulted in more litigation. See Emily Dugan, ‘Compensation Culture is a Myth’: 




111. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
112. Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 650–
51, 659–60 (2002). 
113. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and 
Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. REG. 253, 269–70 (2001) (noting the value of an expert witness’ 
educational pedigree during testimony about alleged liability). 
114. Lawyer Up, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
115. Id. See generally Walter Goodman, Good Cop vs. Bad Cop: Which Image Is Real?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 1995, at C18 (“What really spooks the honest, hard-working, likable, routinely successful 
detectives on ‘N.Y.P.D. Blue’ is the prospect of a suspect ‘lawyering up.’ The detectives cajole and 
threaten to keep the probable perp from exercising his right to counsel, because once a sharp lawyer 
appears the client will say nothing and the audience will be deprived of the confession that climaxes so 
many episodes.”). 
116. N-Gram for “Lawyering Up,” GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com 
/’ngrams/ (graph the phrase “lawyering up”; between 1990 and 2008; smoothing of 3). 
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Figure 1 
 
This example confirms the seemingly increased importance of retaining a 
lawyer within the English-speaking lay culture. But one might also hypothesize that 
the reason for this increase could be associated with greater awareness about the 
severity of initiating legal process itself. This severity, too, may have increased with 
the problem of access to justice referenced above. 
In addition to “lawyering up,” the problem of travel for litigation may be a 
second feature of the modern civil justice system that makes process more 
immediately deterrent than liability.117 Recent decades have seen the rise of large, 
multinational corporations offering contract-based services to more and more small 
consumers.118 Examples of conflict from these arrangements are easily found across 
transactions with cellular phone service providers,119 Internet or cable television 
providers,120 and athletic gym operators among other things.121 In each of these 
industries, corporate revenues depend upon the enforcement of thousands of small-
value form agreements that some experts describe as contracts of adhesion for their 
nonnegotiability and inherently disparate bargaining positions between parties.122 
Tucked neatly into most of these agreements, among many other things, are forum 
selection clauses that require the consumer hoping to pursue a claim against the 
company to travel to the latter’s preferred geographic location for formal 
 
117. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, 
and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 446 (1992) (“The deterrent effects of geography are 
numerous and weighty. The threshold task of merely retaining counsel in a distant location, which may 
seem routine to attorneys and judges, is profoundly daunting to ordinary people.”). 
118. George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME  
L. REV. 955, 958, 961–62 (2007); Trevor W. Nagel & Elizabeth M. Kelley, The Impact of Globalization on 
Structuring, Implementing, and Advising on Sourcing Arrangements, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 619, 619–20 (2007). 
119. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
120. Mark Hamblett, Consumer Suit Over Internet Contract May Go Forward, N.Y. L.J.,  
Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202723226786/Consumer-Suit-Over-
Internet-Contract-May-Go-Forward [https://perma.cc/WQ4N-QYAR]. 
121. Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., 975 A.2d 494 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
122. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 630 (2002). 
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hearings.123 Meanwhile, as these contractual clauses have grown more frequent, so 
too has the risk that consumers will be harmed by products and services originating 
in geographic locales both nationally and internationally remote. Widespread 
awareness of the challenges posed by this geographic distanciation between plaintiff 
and defendant may or may not be present, but the reality of travel as an increasingly 
requisite burden when initiating legal process for tort injury is virtually undeniable 
today. 
Finally, beyond the greater severity of lawyer retention and spatial 
distanciation, the legal process may have taken on added significance due to the 
increased costs of litigation itself.124 While detailed information about average 
billing practices among small firms and solo attorneys is lacking, information about 
large U.S. firms indicates attorney fee rates were increasing before the Great 
Recession,125 and that those have resumed rising every year since 2010.126 But 
perhaps more universal has been a notable rise in the cost of discovery in civil 
disputes.127 This has been in part attributable to the sheer increase in discoverable 
materials created in the age of digital information and communications.128 In many 
cases, large corporate entities are able to use this vast volume of information 
offensively by overwhelming smaller opponents with a deluge of e-documents to 
sift through.129 A 2008 survey of American trial lawyers found this growing trend 
to be increasingly cost-prohibitive for many of their clients.130 While on the one 
hand the general public may not yet be aware of these recent developments in the 
civil justice system, individuals will likely confront these issues upon attempting to 
“lawyer up.” 
The above paragraphs have described three ways in which legal process has 
grown in economic severity to make the comparative significance of liability less 
uniquely threatening for the general public. These developments, I have suggested, 
were in part the result of wider social and technological developments, and in part 
the result of structural changes and corrections in the legal services industry itself. 
 
123. This also assumes prior participation in binding arbitration, which is also frequently a 
contractual prerequisite to pursuing these kinds of claims in a formal legal tribunal. 
124. Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 867–69. See generally In re Fannie 
Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The total amount [Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight] spent on the individual defendants’ discovery requests eventually reached over 
$6 million, more than 9 percent of the agency’s entire annual budget.”). 
125. Katelyn Polantz, Billing Rates Rise, Discounts Abound: A 10 Percent Increase is Offset by Price Cuts, 
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 5, 2015, http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202713809557/Billing-Rates-Rise-
Discounts-Abound [https://perma.cc/8G5H-QNBD]. 
126. Id. 
127. Martha Neil, Litigation Too Costly, E-Discovery a ‘Morass,’ Trial Lawyers Say, A.B.A. J., 
Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/litigation_too_costly_e_discovery_a_morass 
_trial_lawyers_say [https://perma.cc/N2NV-RQU6]. 
128. Id. 
129. The Am. Coll. Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery & The Inst. for the Advancement 
of the Am. Legal Sys., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE AND IAALS (2008). 
130. Id. 
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But legal process held special social significance well before the recent fluctuations. 
As prior writings have already suggested, independent of the economic burdens of 
a formal lawsuit, resort to legal process offensively or defensively has been shown 
in various contexts to carry heavy social meaning. 
Three such meanings worthy of emphasis here are process as privilege, process as 
burden, and process as shame. These interpretations are not exclusive of others, but they 
are ones whose recurrence in the academic literature makes them particularly useful 
to this discussion. Experts describing legal process in these respective ways 
participate in what Erving Goffman famously described as “framing,” wherein 
aspects of human experience are given meaning by virtue of the context and 
language through which they are articulated.131 Explaining how framing applies to 
political and legal culture, political scientist John Medearis has written, “[T]he 
designation ‘frame’ indicates an element of an individual’s or a group’s thinking that 
serves to order the rest, taking priority over new experience or argument, and, for 
this reason, remaining relatively insulated from it. Concretely, frames highlight 
certain problems, guide causal attributions and blame, and place facts within a 
narrative.”132 
In the first framing, process as privilege, legal process has been styled by some as 
a form of civil right worthy of due process protection.133 Advocates of this view 
have argued that although many tort scholars claim this area of law supports 
corrective justice—the righting of private wrongs—what it in fact does is simply 
create a right to seek redress for those wrongs.134 Some have responded that this 
view is not fully distinguishable from the corrective justice approach, but the main 
civil recourse theorists, John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky, have insisted on the 
distinction.135 Meanwhile, in what is likely a public affinity for this view rather than 
a direct indication of public influence by its proponents, signs of a popular belief in 
the civil right to legal process abound in the popular culture and its embrace of the 
phrase “having one’s day in court.” In the celebrated HBO documentary Hot Coffee, 
for example, plaintiff Jamie Leigh Jones is shown testifying before a congressional 
committee on the practices of her former employer and Iraq War contractor Kellog, 
Brown, and Root (KBR).136 In one of the most dramatic moments of the film, 
 
131. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF 
EXPERIENCE 10–11 (Ne. U. Press 1986) (1974). 
132. John Medearis, Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 53, 
57 (2004). 
133. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law 
for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 529 (2005). 
134. Id. at 606. 
135. See Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 107, 
108 (2011). 
136. Alleging rape and sexual harassment at the hands of KBR employees overseas, Jones was 
forced to submit her claim to binding arbitration per her employment contract with the company. Jones 
argued that the required dispute settlement process removed her right to seek legal redress before a 
judge and jury, and the case was portrayed in Hot Coffee as a strong example of the dangers in permitting 
individuals to bargain away their right to legal process. While not portrayed explicitly in support of civil 
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Jones testifies stoically that, “Four years to fight to get in court is not a day in 
court.”137 
Under a second framing, legal process has often been styled as a significant 
burden for people. This burden is often captured in uses of the phrase “dragged 
through the courts.” In one recent occurrence, the American football player Tom 
Brady has been described as getting “dragged through the courts” for his 
involvement in a ball-deflating incident during the 2014 Super Bowl.138 In another, 
drivers passing through small municipalities dependent upon traffic fines for local 
revenue have been described as being “dragged through the courts” of towns far 
from home.139 In still another example, legal experts have criticized the Department 
of Education’s Office for Civil Rights for its practices related to on-campus sexual 
assault in higher education.140 Under new policies, they said, victims “would not 
have the resources and grit to endure being dragged through the courts for years.”141 
In each of these cases, the apparent idea latent in the phrase “dragged through the 
courts” is that there are contexts in which legal process (a privilege to be fought for 
and defended in the prior framing) is (in this framing) an onerous burden on 
innocent defendants. 
In one final framing, legal process is often popularly associated with shame. 
Here, shame can be understood in terms of the classic, albeit sometimes criticized, 
anthropological dichotomy of honor versus shame.142 Shame, in this regard, can be 
understood not as an individual emotional state but as the absence of social honor 
or prestige.143 When it comes to encounters with legal process, one finds cases 
where shame is registered either by plaintiffs for their recourse to litigation, or by 
defendants for their being implicated as targets of litigation.144 
 
recourse theory, the example—and indeed the larger tenor of the film—parallels what scholars have 
said about the proper rights-based functioning of the tort system. See HOT COFFEE (HBO 
June 27, 2011). Jones’ case was later heard in a Texas federal court in Jones v. Halliburton Co., 625 F. 
Supp. 2d 339 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
137. Id. 
138. Bill Hall, Artist Captured the Real Brady—A Deflated Man, THE NEWS TRIBUNE 
(Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/article31882182.html 
[https://perma.cc/96QT-GNNW]. 
139. Editorial Board, The Problem is Bigger Than Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2015, at A28. 
140. Ashe Schow, Members of Civil Rights Commission Oppose ‘Disregard For Rule Of Law’ Over 




142. See Michael Herzfeld, Honour and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems, 
15 MAN 339, 341 (1980). 
143. Id. 
144. David Engel’s 1987 piece, “The Oven Bird’s Song,“ is a keen example. The author studied 
a county in rural Illinois with a notable customary aversion to litigation in cases of personal injury. In 
an area where people knew their neighbors, most were able to settle disputes informally and for small 
sums of money, if any. But community members noted a perceived rise in litigation with the arrival of 
newcomers associated with industrial agriculture and new manufacturing operations. Living in the 
county without the same history and relationships as the host population, new arrivals injured by 
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For transnational comparison, scholars have noted similar aversion to court-
based legal process in Japan.145 There, being named in a lawsuit often means an 
individual or corporation has been unable or unwilling to settle with its adversary in 
available, informal dispute resolution channels.146 Socially averse to open 
confrontation, Japanese society has looked unfavorably upon parties forced to 
litigate, and for this reason encourages defendants to settle under threat of negative 
publicity.147 This form of defendant-side shame has fostered a thriving ADR 
community in Japan, and has been one factor in the maintenance of relatively few 
lawyers, and thus a highly selective bar admission process.148 
These three framings of legal process as privilege, burden, and shame are, of 
course, in many ways contradictory. Yet the contradictions they present are not 
counterproductive. Here, I have suggested not that litigation is properly construed 
in any one of these ways, but rather that its competing critical framings are indicative 
of profound significance in the life of legal subjects. Far from incidental—from 
being merely the pathway to liability as optimal deterrence theory has so far treated 
it—litigation becomes itself a more severe process with heavy symbolic weight 
exerted over participants on both sides of any dispute. The threat it represents, the 
“specter of process” as I have called it here, is therefore far from severable from 
the specter of liability that optimal deterrence has thus far emphasized. 
IV. BEHAVIOR 
In addition to an assumption about the symbolic primacy of liability, theorists 
of optimal deterrence have harbored an assumption about human behavior. They 
hold, in short, that people would naturally respond to the specter of liability by 
adopting the required relevant marginal safety precaution.149 
 
A. Behavioral Assumptions 
This belief in a natural response to liability requires several subsidiary 
assumptions. First, it requires that information about the new decisional law pass in 
complete form outward into public knowledge. Second, it assumes that this 
information be received evenly by the relevant public to recalibrate individual 
 
industrial equipment or other individuals were forced to utilize the formal court system to seek redress. 
Often, Engel notes, they did so because of, rather than in spite of, their outsider status. Litigation, in 
Engel’s study of small town America, therefore, became a symbol for social outsiderness and precarity. 
David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injury in an American Community, in 
LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS 27 (Carol J. Greenhouse et al. eds., 1994). 
145. Tony Cole, Commercial Arbitration in Japan: Contributions to the Debate on “Japanese Non-
Litigiousness,” 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 29, 32 (2007). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 82–84. 
148. UGO A. MATTEI ET AL., SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, 
MATERIALS 268–269, 664–66 (7th ed. 2009). 
149. See Goldberg, supra note 133, at 608. 
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valuations of cost and benefit.150 And finally, it requires that individuals uniformly 
make decisions based on rational balancing between costs and benefits. 
A number of difficulties with these assumptions are readily identifiable today. 
First, information about new legal holdings often does not travel far and wide.151 
Although it may do so in discrete industries with professional associations and trade 
publications, it likely encounters problems for individual conduct like automobile 
driving or social media commentary—activities whose lay participants are not part 
of an insular industrial community, and yet whose negligent performances in the 
aggregate may be capable of generating costs comparable to the industrial and mass 
product torts of high capitalism. 
Second, individuals respond differently to the same stimuli. For many, the 
option to exercise greater care is not even a matter of choice. As John Goldberg 
writes, 
Obviously, a fundamental premise of the deterrence model is that legal 
sanctions are capable of deterring. As some enterprise liability theorists 
have argued, however, there may be a good deal of tortious conduct that 
comes in the form of momentary lapses that may not be deterrable. More 
generally, the available evidence suggests that actors do not respond to 
liability with anything like regularity. This observation does not support a 
global condemnation of prescriptive economic deterrence theory, but it 
does suggest that economists need to recognize the limits of economic 
analysis, which only operates in realms, and with respect to actors, who can 
plausibly be supposed to respond to legal sanctions.152 
Finally, the subassumption of “rational choice” has long been called into 
question.153 Although a world full of calculating, rational individuals makes for tidy 
mathematical reductions of human behavior, many have questioned how readily this 
perspective captures the spontaneous realities of decision making among 
prospective tortfeasors.154 Whereas tort disputes may include cases of heavy 
machinery operators who intentionally skip routine maintenance checks,155 they also 
often include cases of lay drivers who make a sudden miscalculation,156 or 
passionate young teens who spontaneously decide to send a text message while 
 
150. See Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753, 755–56 (2012). 
151. Id. at 758. 
152. Goldberg, supra note 83, at 558. 
153. MICHAEL SLOTE, BEYOND OPTIMIZING: A STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 6 (1989). 
154. Goldberg, supra note 83, at 559. (“An important dilemma facing economic analysis at the 
moment concerns the extent to which it is desirable for the analyst to relax the strict assumption of 
individual rationality so as to make economic models of behavior more realistic. Integrating cognitive 
psychology and social norm theory holds out the promise of making economic analysis more nuanced 
by expanding what can count as costs and benefits, and by considering how cognitive biases cause 
actors to distort information about those costs and benefits. However, as a result, the analysis may 
become even more indeterminate and less capable of generating predictions about the effects of 
sanctions on behavior.”). 
155. Moyer v. United Dominion Indust., Inc., 473 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2007). 
156. Shaver v. Smith, 200 S.W. 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 1918). 
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driving (despite clear law prohibiting this).157 The behavioral assumption, requiring 
each of the three subsidiary assumptions challenged here, has been historically 
coupled with the focus on liability. And together, these two predicates have 
permitted optimal deterrence theorists to conclude that selection among various 
liability options will have one or another specific impact on risk taking behavior in 
the future. For reasons now stated, both assumptions about human responses to 
liability are open to challenge. 
Already, economists and medicine scholars have shown this to be the case in 
“defensive medicine,” wherein physicians alter their clinical practices not for fear of 
adverse judgment but for fear of costly legal defense.158 As access to legal 
representation falls out of reach of more and more people,159 and as the popular 
culture circulates stark messages about the burdens of litigation,160 it is reasonable 
to think that individuals would begin to respond in ways that doctors already have 
been. Indeed, lay persons, perhaps informed by tort reformist backlashes against 
costly “frivolous claims,”161 may be far more cognizant about the certain financial 
and temporal burdens of litigation—even when successful—than they likely are 
about the practical subtleties of success by demurrer, summary judgment, jury 
verdict, or directed verdict. Regarding areas of social behavior that may have been 
recently or long settled, informational distribution about changes in the legality of 
the conduct in question may be slow or lacking.162 And, even if new cases are known 
to prospective defendants, the implications of doctrinal shifts—such as how in the 
prospective process such shifts would exonerate them—may not be. What this 
Article suggests, then, is that there will be many cases, particularly outside industrial 
 
157. Associated Press, David And Linda Kubert, Injured by Texting-While-Driving Teen, 
Settle Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/21/david- 
linda-kubert-texting-driving_n_1820316.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20140307124151/ 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/21/david-linda-kubert-texting-driving_n_1820316.html] 
(last updated Aug. 22, 2012). 
158. David A. Katz et al., Emergency Physicians’ Fear of Malpractice in Evaluating Patients With Possible 
Acute Cardiac Ischemia, 46 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 525, 526 (2005). It is notable that in the case of 
physicians the “opportunity cost” of time spent in litigation are extremely high. 
159. Gillian Hadfield, Lawyers, Make Room for Nonlawyers, CNN (Nov. 25, 2012),  
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/23/opinion/hadfield-legal-profession/ [https://perma.cc/FMH8-
LBKB]. 
160. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, How Much Do Conservative Tort Tales Matter?, 31 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 711, 715 (2006); James R. Copland, Opinion, Time to Cut New York’s Sky-High Litigation 
Costs, NEW YORK POST, (Feb. 1, 2015 1:44 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/02/01/time-to-cut-new-
yorks-sky-high-litigation-costs/ [https://perma.cc/SF8J-CTW6]; Ross Eisenbrey, Tort Costs and the 
Economy: Myths, Exaggerations, and Propaganda, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, (Nov. 20, 2006),  
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp174/ [https://perma.cc/NHP5-8APJ]. 
161. RYAN BRANNAN, TEX. PUB. POL. FOUND., RETURNING JUSTICE TO THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FROM FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION 1 (2011), 
http://www.texaspolicy.com/library/doclib/2011-04-PP03-LosersPays-rb.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/5ELS-BNPR]. 
162. See, e.g., The Crimson Staff, Opinion, Making the Law Accessible: We applaud the Law 
School’s push to digitize its catalogues, HARV. CRIMSON (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.thecrimson.com/
article/2015/11/4/staff-law-school-digitization/ [https://perma.cc/U6WU-DUVN]. 
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activity, where the specter of liability should be low, but the specter of process—
fear of litigation—remains high. 
B. Precedent Behaviorism: Legal Realism 
To better appreciate this, optimal deterrence theorists would be well advised 
to embrace the interpretivist potential of the behavioral approach espoused by some 
of the classic Legal Realists.163 That approach, interested in the way human behavior 
receives, makes sense of, and acts upon legal information, affords necessary 
intellectual capacity to consider the specter of process as an important source for 
deterrence. 
Legal Realism is widely understood to have emphasized the importance of 
pragmatism and social engineering in dispute resolution and rule creation.164 
Although cross-fertilization between American and Scandinavian variants is 
evident, the essential goal of each was, of course, slightly different. Scandinavian 
Legal Realism emphasized the need to purge law of metaphysical abstraction to 
make way for empirical jurisprudence, while the American school took aim at 
specious formalism.165 But even the coherence of the American “school” has long 
been called into question. 
As John Schlegel and others have said, there are multiple “stories” of 
American Legal Realism.166 One of these sees it as a movement in legal education. 
Scholars at Columbia, responding to provocation emerging internally from 
Professor Herman Oliphant, and externally from rapid growth at Harvard, 
attempted a massive curriculum reform seeking to promote a more socially 
embedded study of law to supplant the abstract, doctrinal approach initially 
developed by Langdell.167 That story “ends,” however, with many of these 
Columbia faculty leaving for the judiciary and other academic posts, and therefore 
less with a pop and more with a fizzle.168 
The dominant narrative considers Legal Realism to have been a direct reaction 
against legal formalism that had been dominating U.S. common law thinking in the 
years since the American Civil War.169 Legal formalism purportedly claimed to apply 
naturally occurring principles in scientific fashion to ever-new fact patterns 
separated from the messiness and complexity of everyday social life.170 As legal 
positivism emerged, scholars relaxed their faith in God-given natural law to allow 
 
163. Behaviorism is certainly not coterminous with Legal Realism, and is rather better 
understood as—along with jurisprudence—one among several of its “doings.” See JOHN HENRY 
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 8 (1995). 
164. Howard Erlanger et al., Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?, WIS. L. REV. 335, 356–58 (2005). 
165. MICHAEL MARTIN, LEGAL REALISM: AMERICAN AND SCANDINAVIAN 1 (1997). 
166. SCHLEGEL, supra note 163, at 15. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 19–20. 
169. William W. Fisher III et al., Introduction to AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM xi, xii (William W. 
Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). 
170. Id. 
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that Western legal principles had been developed and “put there” by Man himself.171 
Nevertheless, both naturalist and positivist backgrounds for legal formalism 
assumed with respect to legal rules that “there is a there there.” 
In response, the dominant narrative goes, American Legal Realism questioned 
whether distanced application of rules to facts really explained the way cases were 
decided, or if it did, whether this was appropriate to modernizing, urban society.172 
Codified rules seemed, the early Realist teachers suggested, to favor extant power 
relations and the propertied class.173 Judicial decisions, they continued, seemed to 
reflect legal reasoning grafted onto policy pronouncements in a manner that 
speciously concealed judges’ fingerprints on the holdings they were creating.174 
Acceptance of this, some felt, was nothing to be fearful of and, indeed, could permit 
principled social engineering at a time in American expansion, urbanization, and 
industrialization, when policy was ever more worthy of discussion.175 But several 
challenges have emerged in response to the dominant narrative. Was Legal Realism 
simply a theory of adjudication—about judicial reasoning rather than a general 
theory of law? Was it really simply a reaction to formalism and, in turn, a clean break 
from it? And if Realism considered law to be shaped by social forces, what extralegal 
epistemologies would it really embrace in studying this? 
The legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart argued that Legal Realism was rule-
skeptical and, therefore, insoluble with his own positivism which believed that while 
rules may be contingent upon social values, they are observable and influential on 
outcomes.176 Responding to this, Brian Leiter has written that Realism and 
positivism are not neatly opposed, and that Realism rather presupposes a positivist 
theory of law.177 Hart, he says, was mistaken about Realism’s essential aims. It is not 
a theory of law but simply a theory of adjudication.178 
Yet apart from this rule-skepticism question, some have said that Legal 
Realism was much more than a theory of judicial thinking.179 One key feature of 
that discussion has been the important social scientific approach to law espoused 
by many of the Realists. As discussed below, several of Realism’s key thinkers, from 
Pound to Llewellyn to Frank, felt an accurate portrayal of law required a 
functionalist approach that could be borrowed from the social sciences in rapid 
 
171. Id. at xii–xiii. This gender specificity is retained here in light of the contemporary power 
dynamics of the period. 
172. Id. at 164. 
173. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 17 (1910). (“The 
malefactor of means, the rogue who has an organization of rogues behind him to provide a lawyer and 
a writ of habeas corpus has the benefit of the law in the books.”). 
174.  Fisher III et al., supra note 169, at 165. 
175. Id. at 165–66. 
176. LEITER, supra note 6, at 59–60 (citing Hart on the incommensurability of Realism 
and Positivism). 
177. Id. at 60. 
178. Id. 
179. See e.g., SCHLEGEL, supra note 163 at 4–6. 
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development during the early twentieth century, particularly at some of the same 
academic institutions that housed the Realists themselves.180 
The second debate is over whether Realism truly represents a break from 
formalism. Brian Tamanaha has masterfully attacked this problem arguing that 
several key premises on which the “break” narrative is based have been 
overstated.181 His argument has been that the group of scholars referred to as “Legal 
Realists” were not iconoclastic anti-formalists but rather “balanced realists.”182 
Balanced Realism has two integrally conjoined aspects—a skeptical aspect 
and a rule-bound aspect. It refers to an awareness of the flaws, limitations, 
and openness of law, an awareness that judges sometime make choices, 
that they can manipulate legal rules and precedents, and that they 
sometimes are influenced by their political and moral views and their 
personal biases (the skeptical aspect). Yet it conditions this skeptical 
awareness with the understanding that legal rules nonetheless work; that 
judges abide by and apply the law; that there are practice-related, social, 
and institutional factors that constrain judges; and that judges render 
generally predictable decisions consistent with the law (the rule-bound 
aspect).183 
The dominant narrative, Tamanaha says, has unduly emphasized rule skepticism.184 
In similar fashion, Leiter has described the “received view” of Legal Realism’s 
approach to law as one separated from the formal structures of legal doctrine, and 
rather determined most by sociological circumstances.185 After Jerome Frank, 
perhaps the most behaviorist of the Realists, Leiter calls this the “Frankified” 
view.186 He then calls for a restoration of Realism as a “naturalized jurisprudence”—
as a theory of adjudication that must correspond to empirical observations from the 
social and physical sciences.187 
While the question of whether or not Legal Realism represents a true rupture 
from the past is an important one, its resolution is not an essential feature for the 
revised theory of deterrence aimed for in this Article. Whether consonant or 
dissonant with precedent legal theory, Legal Realism invariably carried distinct 
interest in law’s relationship with neighboring disciplines and their epistemologies. 
While it may not, and should not, be reducible to those other modes of inquiry, it 
was undeniably interested in them.188 This interest stemmed from an emphasis 
 
180. One of Llewellyn’s influences was the groundbreaking anthropologist Franz Boas, mentor 
to his collaborator E. Adamson Hoebel at Columbia University. See William Twining, The Idea of Juristic 
Method: A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 119, 128 (1993). 
181. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE (2010). 
182. Id. at 6. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. LEITER, supra note 6, at 17. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 21. Though “naturalism” is an awkward label here because of its easy confusion  
with natural law. 
188. Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism As Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.  
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among the classic Realists on the role of facts in adjudication, and facts about it.189 
In other words, whereas true formalist judges respond primarily to the stimulus of 
rules, Realist reasoning was driven heavily by the factual details of cases.190 
The importance of facts went beyond adjudication in individual cases. It 
served to allow lawyers and scholars to predict legal outcomes based upon the social 
profile of the judge and factual similitude to previous cases.191 This predictive 
interest leads to one of the more interesting controversies about Realism. While 
some, particularly in response to Critical Legal Studies, feel Realism’s interest in 
extralegal resources to be fluff, or unduly complicated, there is a strong case to be 
made that interest in the social contingency of rule application to facts is more, rather 
than less, practical.192 Understanding that adjudication and rule development do not 
take place in a vacuum, the classic Realists asked us to consider social contingency 
and social impact for the pragmatic reason that, like it or not, these may determine 
outcomes. “A judicial decision,” wrote Felix Cohen, “is a social event.”193 
Given this, one of the fields that most interested the Realists was public 
policy.194 Its use in Realistic jurisprudence is identified by the premise that judges 
arrived at decisions based upon an independent policy intuition, and that these 
decisions are then justified by selecting and selectively interpreting the applicable 
rule of law.195 This approach came to the classic Realists via early teachers like 
Columbia professor Munroe Smith who “took the view, as did Holmes and the later 
legal realists, that law is the product of contests over social and individual interests, 
and that the essential purpose of law is to advance ‘public policy.’”196 
  
 
1915, 1927 (2005). 
189. Id. at 1927–1928. 
190. LEITER, supra note 6, at 24. This is what Leiter calls the “Core Claim” of Legal  
Realism. Id. at 21. 
191. MARTIN, supra note 165, at 30. 
192. Erlanger et al., supra note 164. 
193. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 
(1935), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 212, 223 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). 
194. Neil B. Cohen & Spencer Weber Waller, Taking Pop-ups Seriously: The Jurisprudence of the Infield 
Fly Rule, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 453, 453, 463 (2004). 
195. MARTIN, supra note 165, at 32 (writing on Oliphant’s belief in juridical intuition). 
196. Tamanaha, supra note 181, at 74. 
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C. Behaviorism and the Challenges to Formalism: The Disciplines 
 Related to the emphasis on policy-driven adjudication was the Realist interest 
in extralegal theories and methods. In particular, several of the marquee Legal 
Realists stressed the importance of understanding human action and reaction 
through the behavioral sciences.197 As Michael Martin has said, the Realists’ “critical 
rethinking involved the scientific investigation of legal behavior in general and 
judicial behavior in particular and was justified pragmatically and contextually. The 
attempt to make the law scientific, in order to predict and explain it, made attention 
to legal behavior crucial.”198 This view is directly reflected in writings from Pound, 
Llewellyn, Frank, Cook, and Moore.199 As Llewellyn himself wrote  
[T]he most significant (I do not say the only significant) aspects of the 
relations of law and society lie in the field of behavior, and that words take 
on importance either because and insofar as they are behavior, or because 
and insofar as they demonstrably reflect or influence other behavior . . . [f]or 
all that, it reverses, it upsets, the whole traditional approach to law. It turns 
accepted theory on its head.200 
As likely understood at the time, the study of behavior was the province of 
“behaviorism,” an emergent approach in psychology dedicated to studying human 
thought and emotion not from the “inside” as psychologists had been attempting 
to do, but rather as a response to stimuli from the social and natural environment 
in which human consciousness exists.201 Understandings of the human mind, 
therefore, could only be achieved through the study of behavioral response. 
Pound, later dissociated from the Realists internally for his dispute with 
Llewellyn, may have inspired this interest in behaviorism early on.202 For Pound, 
human psychology would be an important source for knowledge about “law in 
action.” 
Another mode of approach to jurisprudence, often asserted to be the one 
path to reality, is psychological. Psychological exposure of the role of 
reason in human behavior, of the extent to which so-called reasons come 
after action as explanations instead of before action as determining factors, 
has made a profound impression upon the rising generation of jurists.203 
This early interest in psychology was later greatly supported in the work of Jerome 
Frank.204 Frank, a University of Chicago J.D. who had himself undergone 
psychoanalysis, published Law and the Modern Mind in 1930 to a sensational 
 
197. MARTIN, supra note 165, at 30. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Llewellyn, supra note 10, at 56. 
201. Inanna Hamati-Ataya, Behavioralism, in INT’L STUDIES COMPENDIUM 2 (2012). 
202. William W. Fisher III et al., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, 49–51 (William W. Fisher III et 
al. eds., 1993). 
203. Pound, supra note 173, at 63 (responding to Llewellyn and characterizing the features of 
Legal Realism movement). 
204. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Anchor Books 1963) (1930), reprinted 
in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 205 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). 
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reception.205 There, Frank argued that individual judicial psychology was one of the 
most determinative factors in adjudication.206 The legal academic study of 
psychology, therefore, was for Frank a logical development. 
Our law schools must become, in part, schools of psychology applied to 
law in all its phases. In law schools, in law offices and law courts there 
must be explicit recognition of the meaning of the phrase “human nature 
in law.”207 
Frank also noted the changing role for legal education as law scholars grew more 
attuned to the contingency of legal reasoning.208 This concept of adjudication as 
psychologically, rather than merely socially, contingent led some to caricature Legal 
Realism as a study of “what the judge had for breakfast.”209 Others more sensitive 
to its place within a broader intellectual movement have come to describe it as the 
“idiosyncratic wing” of Realism.210 But the purpose of this psychological branch of 
the behavioral turn was not to foreclose the possibility for predicting outcomes: it 
was rather to seek out patterns in the way outcomes were decided even where those 
patterns required extralegal observation.211 
Out of psychological behaviorism emerged a new approach to political studies 
that would call itself behavioralism.212 Whereas behaviorism in psychology had 
replaced the study of internal, subjective motivation and intention with research on 
external, behavioral stimuli and response, behavioralism in politics sought to further 
constrain its methodology to objective, scientific techniques and apply these to 
political behavior.213 This importation, moreover, may have served a pragmatic role 
in political science. With the onset of the Cold War, some within American political 
science sought to distance themselves from “social science” for its contemporary 
conflation with “socialism.”214 The advent of behavioralism permitted these 
scholars to frame their work, for grant-funding purposes, as “behavioral” rather 
than “social science.”215 Political science behavioralism, therefore, was the objective 
study of political behavior emphasizing scientific methods and establishing 
 
205. ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S 
IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 45 (1985). 
206. See FRANK, supra note 204, at 205. 
207. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 156 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930). 
208. Cohen, supra note 193, at 218 (“Courses in our more progressive law schools are beginning 
to treat, most gingerly, of the psychological doctrines embedded in our rules of evidence, the 
sociological theories assumed in our criminal law, the economic assumptions embalmed in our doctrines 
of constitutional law, and the psychological, sociological, and economic facts which give force and 
significance to rules and decisions in these and other fields of law.”). 
209. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 36 (1986). 
210. LEITER, supra note 6, at 28. 
211. Id. at 62 (describing Oliphant). 
212. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market 
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 n.2 (1999). 
213. Hamati-Ataya, supra note 201, at 1. 
214. Id. at 2–3. 
215. Id. at 3, 5; see also LEITER, supra note 6, at 65. 
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“facts.”216 Naturally, with the emphasis on behavioral patterns as “facts,” both 
behaviorism and behavioralism would resonate with the fact-heavy approach of the 
Legal Realists.217 
But beyond psychology and political science, behavior was also a key object 
of study for a growing movement within Anglophone cultural anthropology.218 
With origins in the late nineteenth century, early anthropology was the study of 
“primitive” cultures that Victorian society had grown familiar with through 
colonization and preoccupied with as a foil for its own repressed sexuality, violence, 
and superstition.219 Its emergence, like the other “social” sciences, more 
importantly, seemed to track the rise of Legal Realism.220 Credited as an influential 
proto-Realist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example, had cited heavily to E.B. Tylor 
on primitivism in The Common Law.221 Tylor’s groundbreaking idea of cultural 
“survivals” influenced Holmes’ thinking on the power of pre-formalized legal 
norms in the West.222 
Within anthropology, a significant shift was occurring in the interwar years 
from documenting and ordering primitive cultures at a distance—what had been 
called armchair anthropology—toward operationally understanding the ways in 
which local cultures functioned on the ground.223 This new functionalism seemed also 
to track the rise of a functionalist interest in law espoused first by Pound’s “law in 
action” and later by the Realism of legal educators like Herman Oliphant.224 Karl 
Llewellyn, meanwhile, “saw his behavioral position as being of a piece with modern 
ethnology,” which substituted objective description of a cultural practice “for a local 
report of what a practice is.”225 
Anthropological functionalism arose in two forms between the two World 
Wars.226 The first was “structural-functionalism” developed in England by A.R. 
Radcliff-Brown, who suggested that social structures had emerged to serve the 
function of reproducing the social system in what was essentially a feedback loop.227 
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The functionalism of Bronislaw Malinowski, meanwhile, focused on the 
instrumental needs to which social practices and institutions functioned as 
solutions.228 In developing this approach, Malinowski would also pioneer a 
fieldwork methodology that placed the researcher in the social “field” for extensive 
periods of time to study in-depth the way culture was practiced and lived by 
“natives.”229 Study at this level of depth allowed Malinowski to argue, in effect, that 
culture was a psychological response to common physiological and environmental 
need.230 While not always characterized in this fashion, we might further suggest 
that this was the anthropological equivalent of behaviorism in psychology.231 
Llewellyn’s interest in cultural anthropology has been well documented and 
widely cited.232 It manifested in his collaboration with the Boasian anthropologist 
E. Adamson Hoebel and in their field research into Cheyenne and other tribal legal 
systems.233 But while Llewellyn espoused the functionalist theoretical approach of 
Malinowski, he did not faithfully reproduce the immersive fieldwork method the 
latter had innovated.234 
This period would become the zenith of law-anthropology relations.235 In the 
following years, the latter saw a return to “structuralism” and thus a move away 
from the psychological functionalism of the interwar period.236 Under the influences 
of French theorist Claude Levi-Strauss—exiled in the Americas for some of this 
period—anthropology returned to an interest in cultural mapping but with the 
added influence of European linguistic theory and philosophy.237 Culture, many 
now said, was not strictly about ensuring the functioning of society but about 
expressing Man’s place within nature and cosmology through a universe of 
symbols—especially words—that could all only be understood in relation to each 
other.238 This linguistic turn may have alienated Realist-inspired academic lawyers 
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for whom the philosophy of language was less meaningful than the pragmatic uses 
of it.239 
One final watershed in twentieth century cultural anthropology would alter its 
epistemological landscape in a manner relevant to this discussion. Beginning in the 
late 1960s, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz began writing that language was not 
simply a means to express what people see and do: it was the only means by which 
people could interpret the world around them.240 If nature, society, history, and 
religion could only be conceived in and of language, Geertz seemed to convincingly 
say, then all of human culture operated like language.241 Human behavior, then, 
functioned like text; it could be written, read, reread, and reinflected.242 It 
responded, most importantly, to readings and rereadings of others’ behavior.243 
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V. PROCESSUAL DETERRENCE 
Here then, is the key point. The interpretive approach to behaviorism in late 
twentieth century anthropology—space for which was already carved out by the 
Legal Realists—may be of immense value to a revised theory of optimal deterrence 
in tort law. Taking into account the contemporary specter of process, the revised 
theory may be said to include processual deterrence, the degree to which the behavior 
of legal subjects may be shaped ex ante by the fear of simply being implicated in the 
burdensome process of litigation irrespective of the likelihood (perceived or actual) 
of liability. Interpretivism, construed here as a subset of behaviorism borrowed 
from cultural anthropology, is one approach to studying this.244 To its critics, 
interpretivism is simply the “reading” of social symbols and cues from afar.245 It 
encourages, those critics would say, a high-altitude observation and conclusion 
about what any given symbol or practice “means” to the researcher.246 For legal 
scholars, even those hospitable to the Legal Realist interest in behaviorism, this is 
probably too subjective. Documenting what a symbol or practice means to the 
outside observer cannot be confused with objective science. Distance alone is not 
objectivity. 
But to practitioners of interpretivism, this was never the approach’s purpose 
or strength.247 For Geertz and his students, interpretive anthropology sought to 
document local interpretations of cultural practices, institutions, and beliefs.248 It 
was, as he famously wrote, like “reading over the shoulders” of native informants.249 
This claim would come into question in later years when many of those same 
students would realize their own inscriptions were merely sedimented 
interpretations, and some would embrace this reflection on inscription as the new 
textualist anthropology for the “post-modern age.”250 But, in the decades since, the 
wider discipline has returned to a view that there is a “Real world” to document—
one in which gross injustice and great beauty somehow coexist.251 
For the Realists, the value of interpretation was already relevant in the interwar 
period.252 Llewellyn, for example, described the new enterprise as “the gathering 
and interpretation of facts about legal behavior.”253 Despite his claims to legal 
scientism, therefore, he incorporated to a degree the notion that “facts” about law 
and legal systems did not stand on their own and rather required proper framing by 
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legal academics that could ostensibly develop more accurate interpretive approaches 
through fieldwork.254 
Law and Society scholars—and their theoretical relatives—have long said this. 
For Durkheim, law was a symbol of social solidarity that grew in complexity and 
pervasiveness as societies became modernized.255 But, as some have said, his view 
does not equate to a simple formulation of law as representative of moral values.256 
This possibility of a disconnect between law’s legitimacy and law’s action becomes 
the focal point for later legal ethnography. “Law’s power,” writes Carol 
Greenhouse, “is what it does, exposing the ambiguity of its moral legitimacy.”257 
Similarly, for Malinowski, law’s significance is derived from broader social norms.258 
In his study of tribal islanders in the South Pacific, and somewhat to the surprise of 
Western jurists, unwritten rules relating to criminality and exchange had the same 
normative thrust as formal Western law.259 As Greenhouse says of these 
observations, “legal norms have no binding force of their own; it is other social 
forces that align norms with feelings, such that acting in accordance with norms 
takes on a positive valence—when it does.”260 
The alignment of “norms with feelings” is important for understanding 
deterrence only insofar as this alignment manifests in behavior. People may feel that 
a rule of law speaks to them in an emotional or affective sense, but if they proceed 
to act contrary to that response, then law has not served its social control function. 
Perhaps realizing this important step, legal ethnography has moved away in recent 
decades from trying to understand how law shapes conscience and solidarity toward 
studying how it manifests in human practices.261 As detailed above, the interest in 
practices among social and human sciences can be attributed to several key 
writers.262 Chief among those writers’ goals was a critical confrontation with what 
had come to be known as structuralism. Structuralism, as developed by anthropologist 
Levi-Strauss building on the linguistic theory of Roman Jakobson, viewed culture 
as a complex web of symbols defined always in relation to other symbols.263 For 
critics like Pierre Bourdieu, this understanding of culture as structure was 
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woefully—particularly after the tumultuous 1960s—devoid of time, history, and 
politics.264 
But this attack on the formalism of accepted cultural theory in post-war 
Europe and America had an interesting precursor in the thought of classic Legal 
Realists like Felix Cohen. If postwar social theorists had fallen into the trap of 
viewing culture in static, mappable forms, prewar Legal Realists like Cohen were 
taking issue with the static formalism of law as “legal science.”265 Cohen felt that 
meaning emanating from any given judicial decision was a function of the conduct 
it set into motion.266 This conduct included official state conduct required to 
enforce the judgment, but it also included the practical response of everyone 
touched by the case. Writing against the so-called legal formalism of the day, Cohen 
believed that the traditional “scientific” approach to law belied its human 
dimensions and contingencies.267 “Legal science, as traditionally conceived,” he 
wrote in 1935, 
[A]ttempts to give an instantaneous snapshot of an existing and completed 
system of rights and duties. Within that system there are no temporal 
processes, no cause and no effect, no past and no future . . . . A legal 
system, thus viewed, is as far removed from temporal activity as a system 
of pure geometry. In fact, jurisprudence is as much a part of pure 
mathematics as is algebra, unless it be conceived as a study of human 
behavior,—human behavior as it molds and is molded by judicial decisions. 
Legal systems, principles, rules, institutions, concepts, and decisions can be understood 
only as functions of human behavior.”268 
This critique, predating Bourdieu’s attack on structuralism by roughly a half-
century, voiced several of the same critical concerns: the lack of temporality, the 
hegemony of heuristic snapshots, and the specious appeal of apparent geometric 
models.269 But most significantly, it reasserted the role of behavioral studies for 
proper understanding of law’s meaning through doing.270 
If law as such has been envisioned as a behavioral concept by both classic 
social theorists and classic Legal Realists, legal theorists today may remain 
unconvinced. On at least some level, law must include the written or otherwise 
formalized precepts accepted to govern a community or society.271 But, at the end 
of the day, any inquiry into wealth generating (and other) uses of law must deal not 
only with written pronouncements, but also the ramification of those in the minds 
of legal subjects. In other words, the most relevant feature of law for social 
engineering purposes is its deterrence function, and this is inherently behavioral in 
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nature. So while the previous equation of law with behaviorism did not convince 
everyone, the deep necessity of a revised behaviorist approach today should. 
CONCLUSION 
Deterrence is a behavioral concept, not a legal one. To capture it we must 
know how legal conceptions and misconceptions are taken up into individual 
patterns of action. Moreover, we must understand how subjective meaning 
influences this uptake, and how it changes over time and social space. 
Optimal deterrence has been one of the theoretical successes of law and 
economics over the past half century. As an approach to tort liability, it has gained 
considerable influence and become naturalized as one of the primary policy 
functions embraced by academics and taught to first-year law students. As 
elaborated by an implicit goal of wealth maximization, it forms a simple, 
unambiguous approach to explaining outcomes of civil disputes both locally and 
globally. 
But as a predictive theory, optimal deterrence has suffered from a failure to 
explain how liability will in fact influence social behavior. Operating largely from 
the assumption of rational choice, it envisions a world in which liability outcomes 
translate directly and evenly into general deterrence. 
This Article has advocated for two interrelated corrections to this. The first 
has been an embrace of behaviorism like that initially proposed by the classic 
Realists including Frank, Llewellyn, and Cohen among others. Behavior, those 
scholars taught us, is an essential component to understanding legal systems. But 
second, this discussion has emphasized the need for an updated behaviorism that 
takes seriously the late twentieth century interpretivism first developed in the field 
of cultural anthropology and later absorbed widely across the social sciences. Not 
yet informed by this movement, at least some of the Realists nonetheless seem to 
have anticipated it. 
The revised interpretive, behaviorist approach sheds important light on 
optimal deterrence. If social control depends upon what rules mean to people, what 
rules mean to people is likely shaped by the host of variables that make up their 
unique “realities.” In the contemporary period of privatization and increased 
inequality, wealth and class are two very important examples of this. To the extent 
these can determine capacity to absorb the burdens of litigation, they may likewise 
be shifting the locus of social control from fears of liability to fears of legal process. 
Far from affronting law and economics, observations of this kind should be viewed 
as constructive. Processual deterrence, like many contemporary sociolegal 
problems, is also an invitation to greater transdisciplinary collaboration. 
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